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This paper decribes a formalism for modular, incremental mod-
elling of the beliefs and intentions of the human user of an intelligent
interactive information syatem.
The formalism makes use of partial models of a formal logical lan-
guage with provisions for expressing epistemic and intentional atti-
tudes, the choice of which is inspired by an analysis of the transfer of
information in natural-language information-seeking dialogues. These
models are designed to be incremental in the sense that the model
grows as more information becomes available; this in contrast with
standard logical models for expressing knowledge or belief.
The formalism is modular in that information relating to different
epistemic and intentional attitudes is contained in different `modules',
with the result that only certain modules have to be consulted in order
to decide whether the model represents certain information, and that
only certain modules have to be considered when information is to be
stored in the model.
The use of the model in dialogue management is briefly considered.
The construction and update of a model on the basis oí interpreting
incoming communicative actions is described, and the generation of
communicative acts on the basis of the model is outlined.
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1 Intelligent dialogue and user modeling
Intelligent communicative behaviour is the performance of communicative
actions in compliance with one's goals and information state, in particu-
lar with the available information about the partner's goals, beliefs, and
information state.
This applies both to human-computer communication and to the ex-
change of inessages between cooperating processors in distributed comput-
ing (see Bunt, 1989 and Halpern 8z Moses, 1984, respectively). In the case
of human-computer communication, the "information state" required in a
dialogue system includes a model of what the user wants, knows, believes,
does not know, wants to know, believes that the system knows, etc. In other
words, it includes a user model.
In order to have a meaningful interaction with a human partner about a
certain domain of discourse, a dialogue system of course needs, in addition,
to have domain knowledge as another part of its information state. For many
applications, this knowledge can be considered fixed; the user model, by
contrast, is inherently dynamic: the user's communicative actions constantly
provide the system with new information about the user's goals, intentions
and information. The processing of this new information, i.e. the way the
user model is updated, and the generation of responses on the basis of the
updates in the user model, is what I refer to as "dialogue management". It
forms the "engine" of intelligent communication, and it is a process which
by its very conception involves a user model.
2 The analysis of communicative action
Of central importance for intelligent human-computer communication is ob-
viously that the machine understands the user. To understand a commu-
nicative action means to know what information the action conveys about
the user's intentions, beliefs, expectations, hopes, etc. In this paper we re-
strict ourselves to the kind of communication which we call an "information
dialogue", i.e. a dialogue with the sole purpose of exchanging factual infor-
mation. This has the advantage that the attitudes towards information that
we have to take into account in user models are restricted to epistemic ones:
knowing something, wanting to know something, etc.
An information dialogue is an exchange of communicative acts between
two partners S and U with the purpose of obtaining or providing factual
information. The communicative acts that S and U perform serve this pur-
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pose: they provide factual information, request factual information, verify
factual information, (dis)confirm factual information, etc. Not all commu-
nicative acts are about factual information, however. Sometimes a dialogue
participant refers explicitly to himselfor the other, or to the way the dia-
logue is developing; such communicative acts are called dialogue control acts
(Bunt, 1986). The following example illustrates this.
(1) 1 S: Amsterdam Airport information
2 U: Good afternoon, this is Van I. in Eindhoven. I would like
to have some information about fl.ights to Munich.
When can I fly there between now and ... next Sunday
3 S: Let me have a look. Just a moment
4 U: Yes
5 S: O.K., there are ... three flights every day, one at nine
fifty,
6 U: Yes,
7 S: one at one-forty ... and one at six twenty-five
8 U: Six twenty-five ... These all go to Munich
9 S: These all go to Munich
10 U: And that's on Saturday too
11 S: And that's on Saturday too, yes
12 U: Right ... Do you also have information about the connections
to Schiphol by train?
13 S: Yes, I do.
14 U: Do you know how long the train ride takes to Schiphol?
15 S: You are travelling from Eindhoven?
16 U: That's right.
17 S: It's nearly two hours to Amsterdam ... You change there and
two and a half hours
18 U: O.K., thank you
19 S: You're welcome
20 U: Bye
21 S: Bye
Sheer factual information is at stake in this dialogue only in the last com-
municative act of turn 2, and in the turns 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 17; the
remaining acts, in the turns 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, and 21
are all dialogue control acts. They serve, roughly speaking, to establish con-
tact (1 and 2), to maintain contact (3 and 4; 12), to acknowledge reception
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(6 and 8; 18), to verify (8 and 10; 15 and 16), to investigate availablity of
information (12 and 13), to reach agreement on closing the dialogue (18 and
19) and to close the dialogue (20 and 21). This illustrates our finding that
in information dialogues in a wide variety of conditions roughly speaking
half of the communicative acts are dialogue control acts (Bunt, 1986).
The example dialogue also illustrates that one and the same sentence
may be used with different purposes, conveying correspondingly different
information. The sentence These all go to Munich as used in turn 8 by U,
has on S(among other things) the efFect that S knows that U wants to know
whether the fl.ights in question all go to Munich, whereas the same sentence
used subsequently by S has the effect on U that U now knows that indeed
these all go to Munich. These differences are due to the fact that the first use
of the sentence has the function of a question (more precisely, of a check;
it is an example of a so-called declarative question act; see Beun, 1989),
whereas the second use has the function of an answer (more precisely, of a
confirmation). The relevant units in a dialogue are therefore not sentences,
but utterances: sentences used with a certain communicative function, or
conceived at a more abstract level, communicative acts: combinations of
communicative function and semantic content.
It is, evidently, of fundamental importance to the understanding of an
utterance in an information dialogue to determine what information the
speaker has available and in what respects he wants to expand his informa-
tion. Instead of saying that S has certain information available, we some-
times say that S`knows' something. But we must be careful using the
term `knowledge', for two reasons. First, we should perhaps speak of `belief'
rather than `knowledge', in order to avoid the implication that the available
information is necessarily correct. The course of an information dialogue
is not determined by what is actually true, but by what the participants
believe to be true. What is meant here by saying that S knows that x, is
no more than that S has the information x avaïlable, wïthout implying any
commitment to the truth of x. Until further notice we will use the terms
`know that' and `believe that' interchangeably, as shorthands for `to have
the information available that'.
Natural information dialogues contain a substantial amount of verifica-
tion, which indicates that participants in such dialogues often have uncertain
knowledge about something. I will describe the situation where a participant
S has some information p available without fully trusting it as S suspects
that p. Not only the information available to the partners is crucial in an
informative dialogue, but also the information which is not available and
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in particular the information which they want to become available. There
are two ways in which one may want information to become available: one
may want it to become available to oneself or one may want it to become
available to the partner. In other words, one may want to know something
or one may want to make something known. In information dialogue, these
are the only possible intentions that can underly a communicative act.
On the basis of an analysis of the flow of information in actual informa-
tion dialogues, in Bunt (1986) a taxonomy of communicative action types
has been developed using three major categories: questioning, informing,
and answering acts. In each of these categories a variety of communica-
tive functions is distinguished, which are characterized in terms of packages
of appropriateness conditions. The functions within one category share an
appropriateness condition that expresses the intention motivating the act.
For questioning acts this ia the condition that the speaker wants to know
something (namely the value of the semantic content of the utterance), for
informing acts it is that the speaker wants to make something known to the
addressee, and for answering it is the speaker's knowledge that the addressee
wants to know something. The details of this are of no special concern here;
important is that each utterance is supposed to realize at least one commu-
nicative act, which conveys a certain package of beliefs and intentions on the
part of the speaker. In describing these packages, it is useful to make the
well-known distinction between semantic content and communicative func-
tion, where the communicative function characterizes the way in which the
belief- and intention attitudes of the dialogue partners are involved. The
attitudes most relevant for information dialogues are:l
(2) to know that ..
to suspect that ..
to warct to know ..
to want to make known that ..
As we have seen, these attitudes are relevant in connection not only with
factual information but also with information about aspects of speaker's
and addressee's states, in case of dialogue control acts where the speaker
verifies an intention, checks availablity of information, etc. Therefore, these
attitudes more often than not occur in combinations like U wants to know
whether S knows ...
1 Below we shall consider the question whether a complex attitude like X wanta to know
that .. is better split up into simpler attitudes like X wants that X knows that ..
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In fact, according to the analysis of communicative action in Bunt (1986),
for an addressee who builds a model of the speaker these attitudes always
occur in combination, even if the speaker performs an act that provides
or requests factual information. For what ínformation does an utterance
like It's raining, when used to inform the addressee, convey? The answer
is: it depends. If the addressee can look out of the window and see that
the sun is shining, he will not believe that it's raining. He will, instead,
think that the speaker mistakenly believes that it's raining. The interesting
point about this is that, if the addressee interprets the speaker's utterance
as an inform-action, he will believe that the speaker believes it's raining and
wants to make that known to the addressee - a separate decision on the part
of the addressee is whether to accept the factual information forming the
speaker's belief or not; that will depend on the availability of other infor-
mation. Characteristic of an inform (as opposed to a question or a lie) with
semantic content p is that the apeaker believes that p and wants to make p
known to the partner; therefore, the recognition of the speaker's action will
add the following elements to the addressee's model of the speaker:
(4) Addressee knows that Speaker knows that p
Addressee knows that Speaker wants to make known to Addressee
that p
Moreover, when subsequently the addressee indicates (explicitly, by means
of a dialogue control act, or implicitly) that he has understood the speaker's
act, this means for the speaker that the elements (4) have indeed been added
to the addressee's model of the speaker; therefore, the speaker now adds to
his model of the addressee:2
(5) Speaker knows that Addressee knows that Speaker knows that p
Speaker knows that Addressee knows that Speaker wants to make known
to Addressee that p
In fact, this line of reasoning can be continued indefinitely, leading up to
the thesis that successful communication is achieved only when an utter-
ance gives rise to mutual knowledge concerning the speaker's intentions and
beliefs (see Clark 8t Marshall, 1981).
'To be quite precise, some chronological marking would have to be added.
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3 User models, data bases, and logical models
3.1 Requirements on user models
From the above observations we can derive certain requirements on the
kind of models that are needed to represent the state of a partner in an
information dialogue, in particular that of the human user of an intelligent
interactive information system.
The first and foremost requirement on such user models is that they
should be capable of representing epistemic intentions and recursive infor-
mation about such intentions as well as about both certain and uncertain
information (`knowledge~belief' and `suspicion').
Second, this information is typically incomplete at all levels: there is
usually incomplete information about what the user intends, knows and does
not know. So the model should represent incomplete information adequately.
Third, closely related to the previous point, the model should handle
incomplete information in a computationally effective way. Typically, the
information about the user's knowledge and intentions is very limited at the
beginning of the dialogue; as the dialogue goes on, more and more informa-
tion becomes available. To handle this in a computationally attractive way,
these models should not have an eliminatory character, as standard logical
possible-worlds models do, but should be incremental in character.
Fourth, the models should be suited to updating. The interpretation of
a given utterance typically affects only certain `dimensions' of a user model,
namely those corresponding to the attitudes with which the factual infor-
mation in the utterance is associated, according to the utterance's commu-
nicative function. Therefore, they should be organized in a modular fashion
with respect to the relevant propositional attitudes.
Fifth, the model should take the chronology of the user model changes
to some extent into account. A user engaged in a dialogue may suspend
certain intentions, discard certain information which he later may want to
reconsider, etc.
In the following sections we will outline a formalism for defining models
which satisfy at least the first four requirements; the chronological aspect
will not be considered here.
3.2 User modelling and data bases
For realistic applications, the system's knowledge of the discourse domain
will usually be contained in a data base. A well-defined data base is fruitfully
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viewed as a semantic model of the formal language in which the knowledge
in question can be expressed (see Bronnenberg et al., 1979; Konolige, 1981).
Whether user models can be treated in a similar way is not obvious.
A fairly old idea in AI is to represent the system's knowledge of the
user's knowledge of the discourse domain in a separate data base. This idea
runs into difficulties, however, if we take into account that such knowledge
is typically incomplete.
Suppose a system S incorporates a data base D of elementary facts about
the discourse domain; S`knows' those facts plus all the complex facts that
evaluate to TttuE when broken down into facts in D. Let D' be the data base
containing the elementary facts S believes a certain U, who communicates
with S, to know. If S does not know whether U knows that p, we omit p
from D'. But now suppose S knows that U does not know that p; in that
case it does not help to omit p somewhere.
Absence of knowledge concerning a certain proposition, disjunctive knowl-
edge (such as S knows that p or q), negative knowledge (S knows that John
does not live in Paris), and conditional knowledge pose serious problems for
a multi-database representation system. Moore (1980), who discusses these
problems, concludes that "There may 6e ways to get around these di,~iculties,
but it is clear that any adequate solution is going to be much more complex
than `just using data bases'." Effectively, it seems that the multi-data base
idea has no longer been pursued in recent years.
One possible solution might be to use a set of data bases to represent
the knowledge of U, rather than a single one, and to stipulate that the facts
known to U are those which are true in each of these data bases. Thus, to
represent that S knows that p, that S knows that U knows that q, and that
S knows that U does not know whether q, we might use the configuration of
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Fig.l. S knows that p;
5 knows that U knows that q;
S knows that U does not know whether p.
The use of multiple data bases bears some similarity to the possible-
worlds approach of epistemic logic, the standard way of representing knowl-
edge (or belief) in logic.
3.3 Possible worlds and partial models
In the possible-worlds approach to knowledge (or belief), knowledge is ex-
pressed in terms of the alternative worlds that the agent considers possible.
For an agent S, those worlds are distinguished among the set of all logically
possible worlds by taking part in the relation `accessible for S'. When S
knows that p, this is represented by p being true in all worlds accessible
for S; when S knows that not p, this is represented by p being false in all
S-accessible worlds. When S does not know whether p, there is at least one
S-accessible world where p is true and one where it is false.
This approach is too inefficient for computer implementation, since S
not knowing the truth of a fact q which has not been considered before,
is modelled by adding to each S-accessible world one where q is true and
one where q is false. Therefore, the less an agent knows, the more worlds
have to be represented. Moreover, the facts whose truth an agent does know
have to be represented as such in every one of these worlds. All in all, this
has the effect that for a realistic domain of discourse, with a large number
of potential facts, the representation of an agent's incomplete knowledge
involves an astronomic number of sets of facts; moreover, each of these sets
is large, since possible worlds are complete: every atomic proposition must
have a truth value in every world.
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Ideally, one would prefer to model an agent's knowledge by representing
only the facts he knows, and to represent these only once. This leads to
partial models, where truth values are assigned to only those propositions
whose truth is known. Incomplete data bases, which occur in the multiple-
data base approach, are natural implementations of partial models. Partial
models get complicated, however, because the modelling of disjunctive, neg-
ative and conditional knowledge, as well as of knowledge about absence of
knowledge, is not straightforward and gives rise to similar difficulties as the
multi-database approach (see Moore, 1980 and Bunt, 1989).
We have developed an approach which constructs modular partial mod-
els using structured clusters of (partial) valuation functions, somewhat sim-
ilar to Fagin, Halpern and Vardi's `knowledge structures' (Fagin, Halpern
8i Vardi, 1984; Fagin 8i Vardi, 1985); the precise relation between these
structures and our partial models is explored in Jaspars (1989). For a fi-
nite domain of discourse, each valuation function can be implemented as
a miniature data base containing its extension. A structured cluster of
valuation functions can be used to describe the information relating to one
particular combination of agents and attitudes (such as S's knowledge about
U's knowledge about S's knowledge) and implemented as a small cluster of
miniature data bases; we refer to those clusters (or to the function clusters
they implement) as data modules. The entire model can be viewed as a
network of data modules; we therefore call our approach the Data Module
Net (DMN) approach.
4 Incremental partial models
4.1 Partial valuations and incomplete information
A consequence of considering the beliefs of two different agents is that the
valuation of propositional terms must be agent-dependent. Moreover, triis
dependency cannot take the form of an `agent' coordinate with just two
values, since we also have to deal with the beliefs of one agent about those
of the other (and so on). So if V(s, p) denotes the truth value of p according
to S, and V(u, p) that according to U, we also need something like V,u(p)
for the truth value that S believes that U believes p to have. And so on.
We will return to the agent-dependency of the valuation below, but first
consider some properties of the valuation V(a, ..) for a fixed value a of the
agent-coordinate. We will use the notation Va to indicate this subfunction
of the valuation.
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The ideal of only representing the facts that an agent knows has the
consequence that, if agent a does not know whether the atomic proposition
p is true or false, Va should be undefined for p, i.e. V~ should be a partial
function. However, just making the valuation functions partial is insuffi-
cient for dealing with incomplete information in general. If agent a knows
that p or q, but not which of the two, this cannot be represented by the
partiality of Va alone. What we do in this case is introduce two `alternative
extensions' of Va, one that makes p true and one that makes q true. Calling
these extensions Val and V~„ we have, formally:
(5) Va, (x) - Va(x) for x~ p, and VaI~P~ - 1
V~,(x) - V~(x) for x ~ q, and V~,~Q~ - 1
Va C Val, V~ C V~,
This implements the view that, if S knows that p or q but knows neither
that p nor that q, upon extending his knowledge S will obtain the knowledge
that p or the knowledge that q (or both).
Agent a's knowledge that p or q can now be modelled by V~ having these
alternative extensions V~, and V~„ and the truth condition (6):
(6) a knows that p V q b V~(p) - 1 or Va(q) - 1 or
in all alternative extensions Va; of Va :
V~;(p) - 1 or V~;(q) - 1
(This will be made more precise below.) Figure 2 gives a pictorial rep-
resentation of a model which represents, according to (6), that S knows










Figure 2. S knows that p or q
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We see here the beginning of the use of `function clusters' (or `data mod-
ules'): it is the valuation Va with its alternative extensions Va; that repre-
sents a's information about the domain of discourse.
Note that, by the stipulations Va C V~, ; Va C Va, , the valuations Va,
and V~, indeed constitute extensions of the knowledge represented by Vq.
In other words, the knowledge of Va is persistent in alternative extensions.
We do not want to copy the extension of Va in its alternative extensions,
though; that would go against our aim to represent the facts an agent knows
only once. We therefore define alternative extensions slightly differently by
(7) as valuating only the additional facts, and we will define the truth con-
ditions of 2a-DpL expressions in such a way that they ensure the persistence
of information in alternative extensions.
(7) Va,(x) is undefined if Va(x) is defined, and V~,~p~ - 1
Va,(x) is undefined if Va(x) is defined, and Va,~q~ - 1
`Negative information' gives rise to similar complications. Suppose agent
a has very little information about the nationalities of the persons in a cer-
tain domain of discourse, not knowing anybody who's Italian, for instance,
but knowing that John is not Italian. So a's information about the pred-
icate constant ITALIAN is restricted to that the individual john does not
belong to Va(ITALIAN). This `negative information' can be modelled by
introducing, in addition to V~, a`negative part' Va neg that expresses which
entities do not belong to the extensions of the terms.
As long as the `embedded' language expressing the objects of doxastic
and intentional operators is propositional logic, the need to represent neg-
ative information does not present itself at the level of terms.3 However,
we need to be able to express negative co~rrt.plex information and intentions.
This brings us back to the agent-dependency of the valuation.
Using the subfunction V,,, for S's beliefs about U's beliefs, V,u(p) - 1
represents that S believes that U believes that p, and V,u(p) - 0 that S
óelieves that U óelieves that not p; we also need a way to represent that
S believes that U does not óelieve that p. To this end we introduce the
additional valuation V,,,~9 u , which expresses S's negative information about
U's information.
Alternative extensions, as introduced above, can take care of disjunctive
~For inatsnce, knowing that a propositional constant p ia not true is equivalent to
knowing that it is false.
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factual knowledge. The agent-dependency of the valuation must also take
alternative extensions into account, because an agent may have disjunctive
information involving the other agent. For instance, if all that S knows is
that if U knows that p then q, we need the alternative extensions V,, and
Vs, such that Va, (q) - 1 and Ve~ negu(P) - l. Figure 3 gives a pictorial
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Figure 3. S knows that if U knows that p then q
5 DMN models
In this section we first describe DMN models for the simple case where two
agents are taken into account and one propositional attitude, viz. to have
the ànformation available that (for the sake of brevity also referred to as to
know or to believe). and where the embedded logic is propositional logic.
So we do not consider the internal structure of factual information here.
The corresponding logical language we call 2a-DpL: Two-agent Doxastic
propositional Language. In the next section we will add intention operators.
5.1 Formal de8nition of DMNs
A DMN model can be viewed as a network of modules (function clusters)
linked together through inter-speaker connections. If the model is to rep-
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resent the information state of agent a, it contains a module with index a
which functions as an `entry' to the network (like 5 in Fig. 3). The presence
of alternative extensions depends on which disjunctive knowledge is to be
represented; the specification of these extensions will therefore be part of the
model. This leads to the definition of a DMN model (or `DMN') as a tuple
consisting of 3 elements: (1) a set of agent-dependent partial valuations; (2)
the particular `entry point' valuation describing the domain knowledge of
the agent whose state of information is modelled; (3) the specification of
alternative extensions.
DEFINITION. A DMN model for 2a-DpL is a triple
(8) M- C F~, .F, A~, where:
- F~ E .F;
-.F is an indexed set of partial functions from the
propositional letters of 2a-DpL to truth values;
-.A is a partial function from .F into P(.F) (specifying the
alternative extensions present in M)
In what follows we will mostly use `S' as a name of the agent whose infor-
mation states are modelled, and U as that of the other dialogue participant.
The indices occurring in the indexed set offunctions .F are defined as follows.
DEFINITION. For a model M- C F,,.F,.Q ~ the set IM of indices
is the smallest set such that:
(9) 1. s belongs to IM;
2. if i E IM then is and iu belong to IM;
3. if i E IM and i is not of the form j neg, then i neg E IM;
4. if i E IM and Fk E A( Fi ) then ik E I1~t .
5tipulating that a certain index i belongs to IM is in fact a way of stip-
ulating that the function Fi belongs to . F. Since the definition of the set of
indices of a model is the same for every 2a-DpL model, we keep it for the
sake of readability outside the model definition (8).
Note that the specification of the inter-speaker connections and negative
parts does not form part of the model. This is because we assume that every
valuation has both a positive and a negative part and has connections to
both agents; however, many of these connections will connect up to `empty'
parts, which contain no information.
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We can now make precise what we mean by a`function cluster' (or `data
module').
DEFINITION. A function cluster or data module in a DMN-model Mi
(for 2a-DpL) is the information contained in a valuation F;, for some index
i E IM, plus that in the negative part Fi„~g and that in the alternative ex-
tensions Fiw, for ik E IM.
The index i of the valuation F; which forms the heart of a function cluster
will be called the index of the function cluster.
A DMN submodel is a(sub-)DMN with an `entry point' corresponding
to a particular complex agent~attitude combination c~, such as S believes
that U óelieves that S does not know that (where the `entry' index would be
s u neg s). We will write M; to denote the sub-DMN with entry index á.
Formally, a sub-DMN of a DMN-model M - C Fa, .F, A) is a triple
C Ft, .F', A' ~ where Ft E.F', .F' C .F, and A` is A restricted to .F'.
We now turn to the semantics of 2a-DpL expressions of the form S ~~- X
(`S has the information that X'), i.e., we define under what conditions a
DMN represents that S knows that X.
5.2 Modularity and locality in DMN models
One of the requirements on models that we formulated above is that of
modularity. In order to determine whether S knows that U knows that p,
in the possible-worlds approach one has to consult all the worlds which are
U-accessible from a world that is S-accessible. S's knowledge about U's
knowledge is, so to say, spread out over the entire model, intertwined with
information relating to other propositional attitudes. The computational
complexity of evaluation and update operations may greatly benefit from a
more modular organization, where one consults only the relevant `modules'
of the model. DMN-models have been designed to meet this requirement: to
determine, for example, whether (10) is true in a DMN-model one consults
the function cluster with index su (the module containing what S knows
that U knows).
(10) S knows that U knows that q
15
In very simple cases, evaluation and update indeed involve only one
function cluster. In general, however, the consultation of several `modules'
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Figure 4. S knows that U knows that (p or q);
S knows that U knows that not p
This model represents the information (11):
(11) S knows that U knows that (p or q)
S knows that U knows that not p
5ince (10) can be deduced from (11), we want the evaluation of S knows
that U knows that q to come out true.
The model says that, according to S, U entertains two possibilities,
corresponding to the submodels M,ul and M,,,, . However, in both cases
U holds the belief that not p, in view of the persistence of information in
alternative extensions. So the two possibilities that U entertains correspond
in fact to the totalities of information available at the index sets {su, aul }
and {su, su2}.
When we consider the first of these sets, we are dealing with a situation
where, according to S, on the one hand U knows that not p since F,u„~g(p) -
1, but on the other hand U knows that p since F,u, (p) - 1. Therefore,
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this submodel can be viewed as an ánconsistent part of the DMN. The only
possibility that S can entertain consister.tly corresponds to the index set
{su, suZ}. We therefore define a DMN model to represent a belief on the
part of S only if that belief is true according to the relevant consistent
subsets of valuations.
It turns out that the collections of valuations which are relevant in the
truth-conditional semantics of 2a-DpL are of a the same kind as the collec-
tions that we see in this example. Such collections of function clusters form
small parts of DMN-submodels, which we call truncated suómodels. Their
precise definition is as follows.
DEFINITION. A truncated submodel of a submodel Ma - G F~, .F, A~
is a triple T- G F;, .F', A' 1, where A' is A restricted to .F' and .F' is the
smallest subset of .F defined by:
(i) Fc E .F'~
(ii) if F~ E.F' then F~„~9 E.F' and F„~ E.F~' for every F,,, E A'(F~,~g);
(iii) if A(Fi) ~~ then there is exactly one Fk E A(F;) such that Fk E.F';
(iv) if F~ E.F', where j is a complex index decomposable as j - g h, with
h- s or h- u, and if A(F9) ~ 0, then there is exactly one Fk E A(Fg)
such that Fkh E .F'.
The index i of the truncated submodel G Fs, .F', A' 1 will be called the
index of the truncated submodel.
In words, a truncated submodel with index i is that part of the sub-
model that contains the information locally available at index i, plus what
is available at one of the alternative extensions at that index; moreover, if
the index is complex, say i - sus, we also take the last step back in building
up i, take one alternative extension at the shorter index, say su3i and add
to that the operation used to build i, so in the example we get su3s.
The definition of when a 2a-DpL expression of the form S ~~- ~ is true in
a DMN model will be given recursively in terms of the truth in certain con-
sistent truncated submodels. The set of all consistent truncated submodels
with index i of a given (sub-)model M~ will be denoted by CTS(i).
The fact that the semantics of 2a-DpL can be formulated in terms of
truncated submodels emphasizes that DMN-models to a great extent work
in a modular and local fashion.
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5.3 Z~uth in a DMN model
A DMN model M as a whole behaves classically in that any formula of the
form S ~~- ~ is either true or false in the model. Truncated submodels,
on the other hand, have a three-valued logic: given a consistent truncated
submodel T, a 2a-DpL formula ~i can be true in T, false in T, or undefined
in T. We will use the notation T~ ~ in the first case and T ~ ~i in the
second.
The definition starts off at the level of M as follows:
DEFINITION. The truth of a 2a-DpL formula expressing a belief
on the part of S in the DMN-model M is defined by:
M~ S ~~- ~ b T ~~ for every T in CTS(s), and CTS(s) ~ 0.
In defining the truth conditions relative to truncated submodels the
notion `consistent U-extensions' of a truncated submodel is used. A U-
extension of a truncated submodel with index i is a truncated submodel
with index iu; we use the notation CUX(T) to denote the consistent U-
extensions of T; similarly for S-extensions.
DEFINITION. The truth of a 2a-DpL formula in a truncated sub-
model T; is defined as follows.
(12) For any truncated submodel T - C Ft, .F, A~:
1. If p is a propositional constant:
T~ p ~ Ft(p) - 1 for some F; E~, and
for all F; E.FT: Fi(p) ~ 0
T~ p ~ F;(p) - 0 for some F; E.F, and
for all Fi E.FT: F;(p) ~ 1
The remaining clauses apply to any ( consistent) truncated submodel T and
2a-DpL expressions ~, ~i.
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2. T~~Bi~i ~ T~~axnT~~i
T~~,g~,~ b T~~oRT~~G
3. T~~v~ b T~~oRT~~i
T~~V~ b T~~axnT~~
4. T~~~i ~ T~~b
T~~~ b T~4~
5. T~ U ~~ ~ b for all consistent U-extensions T' of T:
T'~~,andCUX(T)~0
T~ U ~f- ~ t~ for all consistent U-extensions T' of T:
T' ~ ~ and CUX (T) ~ 0
Similarly for T~ S ~~-- ~ and T~ S ~f- ~.
6 Adding intentions
6.1 Intentional attitudes
The `boulomaic' propositional attitudes of intention, desire, goal, want, etc.
have been studied much less than the epistemic-doxastic attitudes of knowl-
edge and belief, and their logic is correspondingly underdeveloped. Boulo-
maic attitudes come in subtly varying forms and present tricky logical prob-
lems. When we restrict ourselves to information dialogues, however, we can
focus on particular intentional attitudes of which a formalization appears to
be feasible.
An important general difference between intentions and goals on the one
hand, and wants and desires on the other, is that the latter can conflict
with what one believes to be possible, whereas the former cannot. One can
very well deaire to become the king of France, even though one does not
believe this to be possible; to ántend or to have the goal to become king of
F~ance is not well possible, however. Also, one can have different, conflicting
desires, but it does not seem possible to have conflicting intentions. Another
difference is that intentions and goals can only relate to situations over which
one has some control. One can desire that the sun shines, but one cannot
intend it.
Intentions can be `static', such as the intention to stay home tonight; or
`dynamic', such as the intention to write a paper. Intentions of the latter
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kind may be called `goals'; inherent to the nature of a goal is that it has
not (yet) been achieved: as soon as a goal has been achieved, it is no longer
a goal. Dynamic intentions (goals) give rise to actions, and are of special
interest here because communicative actions have such intentions, and their
interpretation crucially involves the understanding of what these intentions
are. Indeed, we assume that in an information dialogue every communicative
action owes its existence to some underlying intention, and that the logic of
these intentions is largely responsible for the `logic' of these dialogues.
What sort of intentions can one have in an information dialogue? Since
the participants in such a dialogue by definition are supposed to have no
other purposes than exchanging factual information, we can à priori identify
two kinds of possible goals for a participant: the situation where participant
has obtained certain factual information, or the situation where the partner
has obtained certain factual information. We have also seen that participat-
ing in a dialogue gives rise to situations where one wants to clarify, verify,
explain, etc., i.e. where one wants to obtain or to provide information which
is not of a factual nature ( not relating to the domain of discourse), but of
a`communicative' nature, relating more to the communication as such. So,
the kinds of goals that arise for an agent in an information dialogue are:
A the agent possesses certain information, factual or communicative, which
he did not posses before;
B the dialogue partner possesses certain information, factual or commu-
nicative, which he did not posses before.
When we try to formalize such intentions we may want to take into account
that expressions like S intends that ~ are well-formed only if ~ expresses one
of the two types of intention just mentioned. So an expression like S intends
that ~ITALIAN(john) is incorrect. Since an intention operator may only
occur in combination with obtaining or providing information, one possibil-
ity is to introduce attitudes for these combinations: the attitudes wanting to
know something and wanting to make something known. This possibility has
been explored in Bunt ( 1990), where the first of these attitudes is construed
mathematically as an extension of what the agent in question knows (since
one can only want to know something one doesn't know); the second as a
restriction of what one knows. The latter decision means that we assume
one can only make something known which one knows, which is reasonable
if we restrict ourselves to information dialogues.
Using the complex attitudes wanting to know something and wanting to
make something known, as opposed to the simpler attitudes to want and to
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know, has the drawback that it does not allow the correct formulation of
the desired logical properties. A property one would for instance like a want
attitude to have is that, if an agent S wants that P and knows that p implies
q, then he does not want not q; using ~ to denote wants that and ~~- to
denote know that:
(13) S ~ P ~ S ~~(P ~ 4) ~ ~S ~ ~9
Use of the two complex attitudes wanting to know something (denoted ~--)
and wanting to make something known (~~--~), would lead to two instances of
(13), viz.:
(14) S ~~ P ~ S ~~(P ~ 4) ~ ~S ~~ ~q
S~P ~ S~~(P~q) ~ ~S~~q
The latter of these instances is incorrect, however, since wanting to know
whether ~q is logically equivalent to wanting to know whether q; and is cer-
tainly wrong to require that an agent does not want to know any (known)
implications of what he wants to know. Therefore, in Bunt ( 1990) the alter-
native property ( 15) is suggested, which however is not quite satisfactorily
either, as it is too strong to require that an agent wants to know all the
(known) implications of what he wants to know.
(15) S Í~ P 8i S ~~(P ~ q) ~ S~-q
The problem is that the complex attitude wanting to know, treated as prim-
itive, does not allow the use of a negation inside the scope of the want part
but outside the scope of the know part. This is one of the reasons why in the
present paper we will introduce a separate attitude intend. (Another reason
is that it becomes possible to express that an agent wants the partner to
believe that p without it being logically necessary that the agent himself
believes that p. )
Beun (1989) gives the following axioms for an intention operator I, (S
intends that), where B, stands for S óelieves that:
(16) I,P ~ ~BeP




These axioms are particularly attractive if we interpret the I, operator as
expressing a dynamic intention (or `goal') on the part of S, and B, as our
attitude to have available the information that. The first axiom expresses
that an agent's goal is not believed by him to be achieved already; the sec-
ond that one's intentions are consistent with one's information (and, as a
consequence, that different intentions do not conflict); the remaining two
axioms express full introspective knowledge about one's intentions.
We will take the intention attitude underlying communicative acts in
information dialogues to have these properties. It immediately follows, for
example, that the intention to know whether p is equivalent to the intention
to know whether ~p:
(17) S~ S~-p ~ S~ S~~p
Here we have again used ~, now to denote more specifically the dynamic
intention attitude we want to have, and ~- to denote `knowing whether'
(formally just an abbreviation of `knowing that or knowing that not').
We will call the language 2a-DpL, extended with this intentional opera-
tor: 2a-DIpL ( Two-agent Doxastic-Intentional propositional Language). We
now turn to the representation of intentions in DMN models, which is the
same as specifying the semantics of the intention attitude.
6.2 Intentions in DMN models
Let us begin with an informal sketch of a user model in DMN style where
a system S has available the information about user U that U knows that
p and r, and U has the intention that the system knows that r; moreover,
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Fig. 5. S knows that p, q, and t;
S knows that U knows that p and r;
S knows that U intends that S knows that r.
Here we have used the labels s! and u! to mark the connections to data mod-
ules that express intended states of information. The picture immediately
reflects that this model represents not only beliefs but also intentions, and
suggests that such a DMN has two entry points (marked s and s!) instead
of one; therefore, one would expect such a DMN to be defined formally as a
quadruple rather than a triple, as in definition ( 8). This is not so, however,
since the valuation function corresponding to the entry index s! is always
empty, in view of the fact that the intentions in information dialogues al-
ways concern the knowledge of one of the participants, rather than factual
information. The only thing that has to change in the DMN definition is
that of the index set characterizing the set of partial valuations). Instead of
the first two clauses of definition ( 9) we now get:
(18) 1. s and s! belong to IM;
2. if i E IM then is, ís!, iu and iu! belong to IM;
To the truth definitions given in the previous section we have to add the
definitions of the truth in a model and in a truncated submodel of expres-
sions of the form X~~. This is rather straightforward. The definition of
truth in a model is entirely analogous to the one given in the previous section:
M~ S~~ ~ T~ ~ for every T in CTS(s!), and CTS(s!) ~~.
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To define truth in a truncated submodel, we first note that, with the amend-
ment (18), the definitions of submodel and truncated submodel remain un-
changed. Next we define `S!'- and `U!'- extensions of truncated submodels
by analogy with `S-extension' and `U-extension', and stipulate:
(19) For any truncated submodel T - G Fi, .F, A~:
6. T~ U~~ ~ for all consistent U!-extensions T' of T:
T' ~ ~, and CU!X (T ) ~ 0
T~ U ~~- ~ ~? for all consistent U!-extensions T' of T:
T' ~~ and C UX (T)~ 0, or
for all consistent U!-extensions T' of T:
T' ~ ~, and CU!X(T) ~ ~
Note that the last clause in this rule accounts for the fact that one can-
not have a goal that one believes to be satisfied, as expressed in the first
axiom of ( 16). Similar clauses can be added to take the other axioms into
account .
7 DMN models and user modelling
7.1 Limitations of 2a-DIpL models
The DMN models defined above are too simple to be immediately useful for
user modelling.
First, 2a-DIpL models are designed for the use of the propositional-
logical language for describing factual information, and therefore disregard
the internal structure of such information. For practical use we need DMN
models for a more powerful language, with predicate-argument structures,
quantifiers, modal operators, non-individuating expressions (mass terms,
collectives), etc.
Second, we have mentioned earlier that besides the kind of belief char-
acterized as to have the information that we must also take weak belief
(`suspicion~ into account. The `suspicion' attitude can be handled in much
the same way as the attitude to have the information that, which from now
on we will call to know. (We will use beliefs generically to refer to knowledge
and suspicions.) Since our interpretation of know is nonfactual, it has much
the same logical properties as suspect. There are only minor difFerences,
such as the introspection axioms: for know this is (20a); for suspect this is
not the corresponding formula (20b), but (20c):
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(20a) S knows that p ~ S knows that S knows that p
(20b) S suspects that p ~ S suspects that S suspects that p
(20c) S suspects that p ~ S knows that S suspects that p
Properties like (20a have not been built into the truth definitions given
in the previous section, but they might be.4
In addition, the reltaions betweeen the suspect attitude and the other
attitudes deserves some consideration. For instance, an agent's suspicions
should not contradict his knowledge: if S knows that p, then it should not
be the case that S suspects that not p. This should also be accounted for in
the truth definitions. We will not pursue the addition of the suspect attitude
here, as it mainly has the effect of adding complexity to DMN-models and
truth conditions.
Third, we have suggested in the analysis of communicative action that
succesful communication leads to mutual knowdedge. In user modelling, mu-
tual knowledge may occur within the scope of the know, suspect and intend
attitudes. If S knows that it is mutually known by U and him that d,, then
by definition also S knows that U knows that da. This illustrates that the
facts S knows to be mutually known by U and him form a subset of the
facts S knows that U knows, as well as of the facts S knows that U knows
that S knows, etc. We can thus add mutual knowledge to 2a-DIpL and its
models by adding the appropriate valuations, provided that we make sure
to express in the truth definitions that mutual knowledge implies nested
ordinary knowledge at any depth of nesting.
7.2 DMN models and dialogue management
The importance of sophisticated user models lies in the fact that they should
be the basis for a system to act `intelligently' in compliance with an under-
standing of what the user wants. In particular, adequate user models are
a prerequisite for intelligent interaction, which is the angle from which we
are concerned with user models in this paper. This raises two questions
here: how can the kind of models we have described be used for generating
communicative actions, and how can they be constructed and maintained on
the basis of interpreting incoming communicative actions? These questions
cannot be answered in any detail within the scope of the present paper; in
particular, the planning and generation of communicative acts on the basis
'In fact, they ahould be. There are several choices one can make for these properties,
just like there are many axiomatizations of epistemic and doxastic logic.
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of a user model is an issue in itself. We will however briefly indicate how
a DMN model can be constructed and maintained by describing a ~nzodel
update function that defines how a given DMN should be updated as the
result of interpreting an incoming communicative act. For a more detailed
discussion the reader is referred to Bunt(1990).
Starting point for the definition of a model update function is the ob-
servation that, according to the analysis in section 2, a communicative act
always conveys a package of information about the beliefs (knowledge and
suspicions) and intentions of the speaker. Exactly which package is con-
veyed depends on the communicative function and the semantic content of
the act. The system's understanding of the communicative function and
semantic content of an incoming act should thus result in adding the corre-
sponding information about the user's beliefs and intentions to the model.
Let us assume that an interpretation module has expressed these beliefs and
intentions in 2a-DIpL formulae, where 2a-DIpL is suitably extended to deal
with semantic contents of greater complexity than what we can express in
propositional logic. A complication is now that the model may already verify
or falsify one of these formulae. If it already verifies a formula, nothing needs
to be done, but what if the model falsifies the formula? It depends on `tac-
tical' considerations what to do in such a case; this is not so much a matter
of logic or semantics, but it depends strongly on `social' and application-
specific conditions. We therefore leave this open here, defining the update
function only in case the model does not contradict the formula. This covers,
besides the trivial case where the model already verifies the formula, only
the case where the model is underdetermined with respect to the formula.
In the practice of information dialogues, this is the most important case
anyway.
The update function u takes two arguments, a(sub-)model Mt - G
F2, .F,A ~ and a formula ~, and delivers a new (sub-)model Mi - C
F', .F', A~ ) that satisfies ~i. We will use the notation M;[. ..] to denote
the submodel that is equal to Mi except ( at most) for what is stipulated
inside the square brackets. Note that the formulae ~ always express knowl-
edge of the system about the user, so they are of the form S ~[- ~c~i).
DEFINiTION. The update of a model Mi - G F;, .F, A~ with a 2a-DpL
formula ~ is defined as follows.
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(21) 0. u(M, ~) - u(M„ ~)
For any propositional constant p and index i:
1. u(M;, p) - M;[F,' - F; U{c p, l)]}
The remaining clauses apply to any DMN-submodel Mi and 2a-DpL-
expressions ~, ~i.
2. u(M;, ~ 8c ~i)
3. u(Mi, ~ V t~i)
4. u(Mi, ~ ~)
5. u(Mii U ~~- ~)
~(Mi, S I~ ~)
6. u(Mi, U ~ ~)
u(Mi~ S ~ 4~)
The function u' builds up the `negative parts' of a DMN model, and is
defined as follows.
u(u(Mi~ ~), ~)
if Mi has alternative extensions for index i,
then for each of these, with index j, do
u(Mi~ ~ V ~);
else Mi - M;[A(F;) - {Fi1,Fi,}], and do
u(u(M:, ~ ~)is, ~G)





(22) 1. For propositional constant p:
u'(Mir P) - u(Minege P)
2. u'(Mi, ~ 8z ~i) - if Mi has alternative extensions for index i,
3. u'(Mi, Q1 V ~i)
4. u'(Mi~ ~ ~)
5. u'(Mi~ U ~~ ~)
u'(Mi~ S (~ ~)
6. u'(Mi, U ~ ~)
u~(Mi, S ~ ~)
then for each of these, with index j,
do u(M~, ~~ V ~~i);
else Mi - M;[A(F;) -{Fi17F;,}], and do








In the TENDUM dialogue system (Bunt et al., 1985) a predecessor of
the DMN formalism has been implemented for user modelling and dialogue
maintenance, including a rule-driven strategy for the systematic generation
of communicative acts. Although primitive compared to what can be done
on the basis of a full DMN implementation, this may serve to illustrate how
such models can be used for the generation side of communicative acts.
The TENDUM generation strategy uses the repertory of communicative
acts mentioned in section 2, dividing these acts into three categories: ques-
tioning, ànformàng, and answeràng. In each category there is a`least specific'
type of action, called QUESTION, INFORM and ANSWER, respectively, and a
variety of more specific action types. An action type is more specific if it
has additional conditions for its appropriate use. The actions in the ques-
tioning category are motivated by an intention on the speaker of the form
S~ S ~-~, those in the informing category by an intention of the form
S~ U ~~-~, and those in the answering category by S ~~- U~ U~~.
Therefore, the generation strategy begins by checking whether the current
user model contains elements of one of these forms.b Suppose, for instance
the user model M contains the element S ~~- U~ U ~-p. In that case
a rule is applied which activates a procedure for evaluating the additional
conditions for generating an answering action, in particular for evaluating
the condition S ~- p, i.e., for checking whether the system knows the an-
swer. This simply comes down to using the truth conditions described in
section 5 for determining whether M ~ S ~-p. If this comes out true, say
because the system has the information that not p, then the generator looks
for the possibility to generate a more specific response (such as CONFIRM or
DISCONFIRM), by trying M~ S ~~- U ~...p (where U ~...p stands for: U
has a suspicion about p. If this comes out false, then the system generates
the action CANSWER, ~p ~. For more about the systematic generation of
communicative actions, including actions with an articulate semantic con-
tent rather than `p', see Bunt ( 1988).
6In fact, the algorithm looks first in a part of the user model which is temporarily kept
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